Cryptera Keyserver¶
Firmware signing keys decide what code your devices will run. Certificate Authority (CA) keys decide which devices your infrastructure will trust. If either leaks from a build server, a CI secret store, or a developer laptop, an attacker can ship firmware that your entire fleet accepts as genuine, and you may never know it happened. In most organizations, that is where these keys live.
The Keyserver removes the keys from that equation. Private keys are generated inside a Hardware Security Module (HSM) and never leave it in plaintext. Instead of handing out keys, the Keyserver hands out signatures: a pipeline authenticates, requests a signing operation, and receives a signature or a device certificate. Policy decides what it can sign, how many times, for how long, and with whose approval. Every operation, approval, signature, and administrative change is recorded in a queryable audit log.
For product designs that require the private key on the device or build host, a key can instead be created in an encrypted KEYSTORE, which makes it exportable. The same permission model applies, and every export is audited. This is a per-key, opt-in choice; see Key Storage.
flowchart LR
CI(["CI/CD pipeline"])
APPR(["Human approver"])
PROV(["Provisioning station"])
subgraph ENV["Cryptera Controlled Environment"]
direction TB
subgraph KS["Keyserver"]
POLICY["Operations & policy<br/>usage limits · time window · approvals"]
AUDIT[("Audit log")]
POLICY -.operations, approvals,<br/>signatures, admin changes.-> AUDIT
end
HSM{{"HSM<br/><b>holds the private keys</b>"}}
POLICY <-->|"signs inside the HSM"| HSM
end
CI <-->|"hash to sign<br/>signature back"| POLICY
APPR -->|approval| POLICY
PROV <-->|"device CSR<br/>certificate back"| POLICYDiagram: CI/CD pipeline; Human approver; Provisioning station; Cryptera Controlled Environment; Keyserver; Operations & policy usage limits · time window · approvals; Audit log; HSM holds the private keys; signs inside the HSM; hash to sign signature back; approval; device CSR certificate back
Only requests, signatures, and certificates cross the boundary. Inside it, the Keyserver decides what gets signed, by whom, and how often, and records every decision.
A stolen laptop contains no key material. A compromised pipeline can at worst request signatures, visibly and within its usage limits and configured approvals. You cut it off by removing its role instead of rotating keys across a product line. The audit log records who signed each build, when, and who approved it.
OpenSSL, JSign, GitLab CI, Azure DevOps, and other tools that can use a token integrate through the REST API or the Cryptera PKCS#11 module, and keep their own workflow: you install the module, then supply a token and an approved operation. Identity comes from your own OAuth2/OIDC provider, such as Entra ID or GitLab, so access follows your enterprise account lifecycle, including MFA.
Where do I start?¶
The tutorials run against a Cryptera trial environment. If you don't have one yet, sign up for a trial. Your instance identifier arrives in the getting-started email; see Trial Environment for what the trial contains.
Then choose the path for your role in the Overview, the first page of the Docs tab.
Keep your own flow¶
The Keyserver can be integrated into existing workflows without replacing the tools and systems already in use.
Authentication. Use your existing OAuth2/OIDC identity provider, such as Microsoft Entra ID or GitLab. User authentication follows the provider's configured policies, including MFA where enabled, while the Keyserver manages permissions to its operations.
CI/CD. Integrate signing operations into existing GitLab CI and Azure DevOps pipelines. Pipelines authenticate and request signatures from the Keyserver while retaining control over their build and deployment processes.
Signing tools. Tools such as OpenSSL and JSign can perform signing operations through the PKCS#11 module. Applications can also integrate directly through the REST API.
The Tutorials¶
Each tutorial runs on its own against a trial environment. Part 1 is recommended first, but not required. Trial Environment describes what a trial contains.
| Tutorial | What you do |
|---|---|
| Admin Configuration (Part 1) | Create a ROOT and FW key, a role from the fwsigner Nature, and authorize a CI client |
| Sign Code (Part 2) | Sign a binary with the pre-seeded fw-quickstart key and verify it, then require an approver and run the approval flow |
| Issue a Device Certificate (Part 3) | Build a separate device ROOT and CA, then issue a certificate from a CSR |
Key Concepts¶
| Concept | What it is |
|---|---|
| Access Control | How subjects, roles and operations combine, and the checks every API call passes |
| Subjects | The Keyserver's records of the users and clients that call it, matched to the identity in each access token |
| Roles | Named sets of permissions, usually built from Natures; a subject has the union of its roles' permissions |
| Authentication Model | How users and clients get access tokens from an OAuth2 authorization server, and how the Keyserver validates them |
| Administrative Sessions | The gate on configuration changes: a session authorized by the configured number of administrators |
| Key Types and Storage | ROOT, CA and FW keys, the certificate hierarchy they form, and where private keys are held (HSM or KEYSTORE) |
| Operations | Time-limited tickets that authorize use of signing keys a set number of times; every sign order and certificate request names one |
| Approval Workflow | The human checkpoint: keys with Required Approvers need approvals on an operation before it can be used |
| SBOMs and Supply-Chain Regulation | What the EU Cyber Resilience Act requires of an SBOM, and how the Keyserver signs SBOMs as attestations |